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OHAPTER I
INTRODUOTION

.

.9 .,;.,

In various works of St. Thomas there are what appear to
be conflicting statements about the relative superiority of
different forms of rule.
example, it is said:

In the De6egimine

~rincipum,

for

"More useful ••• is the rule of one man

than the rule of many." 1

In the Summa theologica we read:

"There is likewise a form of government which is a mixture of
these, and this is the best." 2

In the Oommentary ~ the

Politics of Aristotle alone there are the following statements:

"Monarchy is the best form of government and the one

most in accord with right reason." 3

"It is manifest that

the aristocratic state is better than a monarchy." ~

"The "..

multitude is stronger, better and richer than any particular
groups within it.
and others as well.

For the multitude includes those groups
10 group of a few does this." 5

The

--------------1 De regimine principum, I, 2. Here, as in all other instanoes of translation occurring in the text, the En~ish
version is the present authorts responsibility, unless
other indication is made.
2 Summa theologica, Iallae, q. 95, a.4, c.
3 PolitiCS, IV, 1.
4- ~., III, 14.
5 Ibid., III, 11.
1

2

texts oould be multiplied, 6 but the apparent diso~panoies
are well known. 7
The oPPosition is most 01ear1y to be seen in the apparent
insistenoe of the

~

regimine on monarohy and the often oited

.

passage of the Summa theo10gioa tn~whioh it is maintained
"that the best ordering of powers was that established by the
Old Law." g

It is not implied, of fourse, that St. Thomas

was guilty of oontradiotion or inoonsistenoy, but the point
is to disoover the preoise framework whioh holds these different propositions together.
Several proposals have been offered.

For Gilson, the

teaohing of the Summa on the mixed regime is seemingly taken
as a olarifioation by St. Thomas of what he meant by monarohy. 9
tion 10

But there seem diffiou1ties in Gilson's interpretaof the passage in Iallae, q.105, a.l, whioh is th~

text oommonly oited in this matter.

These difficulties will

--------------6 Of., for example, the arguments for monarohy in De reg.,
7

g
9
10

I, 2; S.T., la, q.103~ a.3, 0.; Oontra Genti1es,-rV, 76;
for government by an elite, in~. III, 14; for the mixed
form, the famous passage, S.T., Iallae, q.105, a.1.
Of. Father Garrigou-LagrangeTs formula of reoonoi1iation:
"Konarohia est regimen imperfeotorum ••• , demooratia est
regimen perfeotorum," in the prefaoe to the Frenoh ~rans
lation of De reg imine prinoipum (Du ~ouvernement royal,
ed. de 1a Gazette Franoaise, Paris, 926, p.xvl) together
with Gilson's observation that Unrest soutenable que du
oate des sujets" (E.Gi1son, Le Thomisme, ed. 5, Paris,
Vrin, 1945, p.459, n.1).
S.!., Iallae, q.105, a.1, o.
ire Gilson,. ~.oit., pp.456 et seq.
Ibid., p.~57, of., n.3.

,

3
be presented later in this thesis.

Here we wish merely to

note that if the difficulties prove to be real, they would
. obstruct the collation Professor Gilson suggests. 11
Father M.-D. Chenu would, in effect, resolve the antinomy
• 47

between the De regimine.and the SWriina by suppressing one of
the members, namely, the De regimine.

That would seem to be

the result of his proposal that the.De regimine be treated as
"a moral and pedagogical treatise for a prince's use, not an
organic work of political theory.' 12 What merit we find in
Father Chenuts suggestion will be indicated further along, 13
in our discussion of the sources on which this thesis is based.
The most thorough treatment of the problem is that of
Marcel Demongeot. 14-· He has indicated the great complexity
of the problem and the necessity of a multitude of distinctions

-.....

~----- ...

-----

11 Of. the similar proposed 'solution" of the difficulty in
Antonio Burri, Le teorie politiche di san Tommaso e il
moderno diritto"publico (Roma, 1994-}T ·Cos1 s. Tommaso
riduce in ultima analisi Ie forme di governo alltuno e
non uno, che come direbbe il Cousin sono gli elementi
supremi di ogni teoria metafisica; ed applicata tale
teoria aIle forme di governo, ne segue come osserva il
Taparelli (Dissert. II, cap. IX, nota LXVI), ohe la monarohia e la poliarohia differisoono essentialmente in oio,
che nella prima l'unit~ sociale nasce dall'uno natur~le,
nelltaltra dalltuno artificiale 0 morale." lP755). Along
similar lines, though more superficially, argues Wilhelm
Muller, 'Der Staat in seinen Beziehungen zur sittliches
Ordnung bei Thomas von Aquin,' Baumker's Beitrage, XIX
(1916).
12 Bulletin thomiste, 1929, p.19g.
13 See p.
/
14 Marcel Demongeot, Le meilleur regime politique selon saint
Thomas, Paris, Blot, 1929.

for its proper understanding. 15

4
The differences of.'possible

points of view in approaching the problem, which he seeks to
olassify with the aid of "formal logio," 16 are presented in
the following diagram: 17

l)Purely s p eou-1
lative and
Best government absolutely
abstraot
I. The P,oint
of View of
the Philosopher
(Speoulative with
regard to
end and
general)

2)Speoulative )
with regard
to mode
3)Praotioal
with regard
to mode

•

Regime in
itself
the best
a)The best
regime desirable
(The model
regime)
b)The less
evil

II.The Point
of View of
the Legislator
(Purely
practioal
and partioular)

a)The best regime desirable for a oity
suoh as that under
oonsideration

Point of
view praotioal with
regard to
mode and
oonorete.
(The best
regime,..
relativel!)

b)The best regime possible for this oity

----------------

e'

15 "Suivant le point de vue, la solution variera. Aussi
risquerait-on fort de ne pas saisir dans toutes ses nuanoes
1a pensee de saint Thomas, et de nty voir en definitive
qu'affirmations oontradiotoires, si lion ntavait soin de
poser au preab1e quelques distinotions." ibid., p. 4.

16

~.,

p.76.

17 lliS.., p.g.

----

5
In this thesis it is proposed that Demongeot's schema
be modified by the elimination of the first member -- "purely
speculative and abstract· -- for the following reasons:
(1) The introduction of "formal logic" gives the question an
essentialist aspect.

(2) It woulcrkeem that the considera-

tion of "the best government absolutely· does not belong outside the practioal order; such a con:ideration is still within
the field of moral philosophy. IS
The elimination of the ·pure1y speculative and abstract"
member would seem to be possible if we utilize a more profound
analysis of practical knowledge.

The consequent reduotion of

the state of the question to the oonfines of the praotioa1
would seem to bring us oloser to the oonceptual framework
within whioh st. Thomas considered the question of forms of
government.

For in his prologue to his CommentarI

~

the

Politics he says:
Secondly we must give an acoount
of the genus of this soienoe. For

---------------...
lS This point will be more fully disoussed in chapter II.
Here it will suffioe to note that the thing whioh is
operable beoomes the objeot of a purely speculative knowledge only on the supposition that its quid est is ex~lu
sively attended to. Of. Oajetan's commentary on la, q.1~,
a.16: •••• per specu1ativam ex modo tantum, id est de objeoto operabi1i modo speou1ativo, non intelligitur scientia
de operabi1i in universali ••• sed intelligitur soientia
de operabili sorutans non quomodo res fiat, sed quid est.'
So long as it remains a question of "Ie meilleur gouvernement" this supposition does not seem verifiable.

since practical sciences are
distinguished from speculative
sciences in that the speculative
are ordered only to the knowledge
of the truth while the practical
are ordered to operation, this
science has to be a part of practical philosophy. '.• t.pis has to
be since the state is a certain
kind of whole about which the human reason is not only knowing
but also operating. Moreover,
since there is a reasoning which
is concerned with maKing by an
operation which passes over to
external matter -- this pertains
to the so-called mechanical arts,
such as carpentry, ship-building,
etc. -- and since, on the other
hand, there is a reasoning which
is concerned with action by an
operation which remains in him
who acts-- examples of this are
counselling, choosing, willing,
etc., and such actions pertain
to moral science --, it is evident that political science,
which deals with ordering among
men, is not to be placed under
the sciences concerned with making, i.e., the mechanical arts,
but rather is to be placed under
the sciences concerned with acting, i.e., the moral sciences.

.'

6

Oollocation of the question wholly within the practical
realm brings the whole line of discussion into continuity
with prudence ("practical wisdomlt), 19

---_.......-..__...---.

which will make.the

19 Throughout this thesis we are understanding 'prudence" in

the sense that st. Thomas uses it, ViZ., as the moral virtue of prudence. This term has suffered great debilitation
by the modern connotations attaching to it. We hope it
will be olear from the development of our thesis that it
i8 a grave injustice to St. Thomas to interpret his

7
final judgment a8 to the form of rule in a given case'.

This

last point is most important in any attempt to recover the
Thomistic approach to this question.

Karitain has said:

The more one meditates on the
moral teaching of ~t! Thomas,
the more one remarrs"Ytha t this
concrete continuity) the effective continuity of the whole
order of the practical} is constantly presupposed (without
prejudice to the dif~rences of
nature between the faculties or
the habits which are involved).
rrom moral philosophy down to
the prudential act, a single
concrete intention traverses
the whole order of practical
thinking, which becomes less
and less -science l in the degree that it becomes more and
more -practical-. 20

--- ... ----------·prudence· as·expediency·. This is what Professor Adler
does in the following passages: IIf the rule for the common interest is the only principle which distinguishes ~
good from bad government, and if the number of persons
who exercise rule fails to distinguish types of good government as grades of perfection, the only argument which
can be made for the superiority of one type of good government over another is entirely prudential: that one is
a more expedient means for achieving the common good. Thus
st. Thomas argues for the superiority of monarchy in De
Regimine .••• What is said here against St. Thomas can be
said similarly against other political writers who have
used the principle of number to distinguish one good state
from another, and have therefore been forced to orde~·these
good forms of government as better or worse entirely in
terms of expediency ••••• (Mort1mer J. Adler in "Round
Table Discussion: Problem -- In Terms of What Moral Principle Is Democracy the Best Government,· Proceedings of
The Amer1can Catholio Philosoph1cal Assoo1ation, XV 1939
p.l45 -- 1tal1cs Adlerts.)
20 Cf. Les degres du savo1r, Paris, Descl'e, 1932, p.g9l.

g

We shall attempt to show that the defeot of Demongeoyts olassifioation is that by ino1uding the speou1ative member it
fails to keep this fundamental oontinuity. 21
In the effort to resolve the apparent disorepanoies in
the Thomistio teaching on the besf form of government our procedure will be as follows:

First we shall present and disauss

a sohematization representing the orlanization of moral knowledge.

We shall then propose the hypothesis that the "dis-

orepanoies· are due to the level of moral knowledge at which
in eaoh oase the problem is considered.
With regard to the sources of the texts upon which this
thesis is based, it should be noted in the first place that
the De reg imine is not being used.

The portion of the De

regimine whioh is to be attributed to st. Thomas

-

seem~not

be, if taken as a whole, really pertinent to the problem
the best form of governance.

to
of~

The De regimine is not a guide

to choice (which, as the development of our thesis wi1i Show,
is the central consideration in our problem); so far as Cyprus
to whose sovereign the work is addressed, was conoerned, the
choice had already been made.

In this sense, the R! regimine

oontains "second intention" politics ; it assumes the qui'stion

---------------21 lot that Demongeot ignores the funotion of prudenoe (see
~. 211., p.~); but he does not make what seems to be the
neoessary integration with the eventual prudential deoision
to present in its fullness the Thomistic approach to this
problem.

we are disoussing as already answered. 22

9
There are~f oourse

some texts in st. Thomas's portion of the De regimine whioh
oould be oited with pertinenoe in the development of our thesis.

But if these texts are not adduoed, there is no real

.

loss,for the dootrine they represebf is repeated in other
plaoes.

And in view of the oharaoter we have assigned to

st. Thomas's portion of the De regimine taken as a whole, it
i

would seem that our thesis will have a olearer line if texts
from this work are left out of disoussion.
The prinoipal question in the mat.ter of souroes is what
use may legitimately be made of the Oommentary
of Aristotle.

~

There is a wide variety of opinion.

the Politios
Georg,von

Hertling formulated the following rule:
••• that eaoh passage of the
Oommentaries on Aristotle must
be oonsidered for itself and
that suoh passages oan be adduoed as representing Thomas's
own views only when, inasmuoh
as, and insofar as their oonfirmation oan be found in his
other writings. 23
Aotually, however, this hardly takes us beyond the position
of Antoniades, for whom the Oommentaries represent simply and

---------------22 There is thus some merit to the proposal of Father Ohenu,
whioh we noted earlier, p. J.
23 Georg von Bertling, 'Zur Beantwortung der Gottinger
Jubilaumsrede,' Kleine Sohriften zur Zettgesohiohte und
Politik, Freiburg i. B., 1997, p.161, oited by Muller;.QE. •

.ill., p·3·

10
solely the thought of Aristotle. 24 At the other ex~eme is
Baumann; according to him the Oommentaries may be taken as
containing the thought of St. Thomas. 25

Demongeot notes the

opinion of reugueray that "the essential interest of the Q2!-

.

.9 ...,

mentaries is that they teaoh us the politioal vocabulary of
at. Thomas." 26

,This is the view whioh Demongeot adopts; it

will likewise be ours.
Briefly, one can say that st.
Thomas makes his own everything
in the politics of Aristotle
which 1s not in conflict with
his theology •••• In our view,
as a consequence of the principles we are going to propose,
the Oommentaries furnish all
the conoepts, all the "matter"
of St. Thomas's own politioal
thought, to be modified when
neoessary in the light of the
principles oontained in the Sum~ and the De regimine princr=pum. 27
We are now ready to proceed with the presentation of our
hypothesis.

The next chapter will discuss the organization of

moral knowledge.

In acoordance with the schema this organiza-

tion seems to imply, we shall attempt to assign st. Thomas's
various oonsiderations of the problem of the best form of
~ Staats1ehre des Thomas !£ Aguino,
Leipzig, 1990, p. 3.
25 J. J. Baumann, Die ataats1ehre ~
Thomas ~ Aguino,
Leipzig, Hirzel, 1973, pp. 74=75.
26 Demongeot, ~. £!i., p. 16.
27 Ibid., p. 17.
+

24 Basilius Antoniades,

a.

11

government to their proper plaoe in the sohema.

The~ast

three ohapters' will therefore be devoted suooessively to indioating what we believe are the speculatively-praotioal,
praotioally-praotioal, and prudential oonsiderations •

•

.'

.'
CHAPTER II

THE ORGANIZATION OF MORAL
KNOWLEDGE

...

.,

If, as we have seen, 1

St. Thomas places politioal con-

siderations under the genus of practjcal knowledge, it would
seem that we must look to the organization of moral knowledge
to resolve any 'disorepancies· in his political teaching.

It

is our hope to present by way of hypothesiS the framework together with its levels within which St. Thomas treats the
question of the best form of government.

To achieve this we

must make a detailed study of the order of practioal knowing.
Following Aristotle, St. Thomas divides knowing first of
all into speculative and practical:
The theoretical, or speculative,
intellect is properly distinguished
from the operative, or practical,
intellect in this, that the speculative intellect has for its end
the truth it considers, whereas the
praotical intelleot orders the truth
considered to operation as its end:
and hence the Philosopher says in
l!l~ Anima that they differ from
each other with regard to end, and
in II Metaphysic. it is said that
the end of speculative [knowing] is

...... ------------1

Cf. chapter I, pp.

et seq.
12

..

13
truth, and the end of operative,
or practical, [knowing] is action.
Since, therefore, it is necessary
that the matter be proportioned
to the end, it is necessary that
the matter of the practical soienoes
be those things whioh oan be done
by our effort, so\h.t the knowledge
of those things oan be ordered to
operation as an end. But the matter
of the speoulative soienoes must be
things which are not done by our
work; whenoe their oqpsideration
oannot be ordered to operation as
an end, and it is in aooordanoe with
this distinotion among things that
the speoulative soienoes are distinguished. 2
The end is the basis of this division:
Sinoe philosophy or the arts are
distinguished into theoretioal and
praotioal [branches], this distinction must be based upon their end;
thus the practioal is said to be
that whioh is ordered to operation
and the theoretioal, that whioh is
ordered only to knowledge of the
truth. 3
Here, however, we ought to note that a thing operable in
,

itself may beoome the object of a purely speoulative consideration.

This ocours when "an operable thing is not consid-

ered as operable."

4 st. Thomas has oocasion to point out

this possibility in discussing Godts speoulative knowleqge
2 Ia Boetii de Trinitate, q.5, a.l. Of. ~ veritate, q.2,
a. 8j ~.1., la, q.79, a. 11; IA ~ Anima, lib. III,
leot. 15.
3 In~. de !rin., q. 5, a. 1, ad b .
4 ~ veritate, q. 3, a. 3. Of. ad 2um.

14of oreated things:
••• A soienoe oan be oalled speoulative: ••• first, beoause the
things known are not operable by'
the knower -- suoh is man's knowledge of natural or divine things;
seoond, beoause of.tite mode of
knowing, as for example, a builder
oonsidering a house by defining,
dividing, and pondering its universal predioates. This latter is to
oonsider operable thipgs in a speoulative manner, and no~ insofar as
they are operable. For the operable
is something by reason of the applioation of form to matter and not by
reason of the resolution of a oomposite into its universal formal
prinoiples. 5
It is to this latter type of

~nowledge

that Demongeot's

first division, i.e. "purely speoulative and abstraot," oorresponds.

It is our opinion, however, that it is impossible

to raise the question of "the best government", even "absolutely" or "takentnakedlytl, 6 on this level.

Questions

--------------5 8.1., la, q.l4-, a.16, o. Of. Karitain's oomment on this pas-

sage: "11 oonvient de remarquer que dans oette question 1~,
a.16, saint Thomas, quand il parle de 1a soienoe de mode
speoulatif d'un objet dtoperation, ne pense pas a 1a oonnaissanoe que nous appelons ioi speoulativement pratique,
~ar exemple a la philosophie morale.
Oomme le note Oajetan
('per speoulativam ex modo tantum, id est de objeoto operabili modo speoulativo, non intelligitur soientia de o~era
bili in universali, •.• sed intel1igitur solentla de operabili sorutans non quomodo res fiat, sed quld est'), 11 pense
a un oonnalssanoe purement speoulative dtun objet qui par
ailleurs se trouve etre operable. C'est ainsi que Dieu a
des ohoses qu t l1 fait ou peut faire une oonnaissanoe non
seulement pratique mais aussl speoulative, qui oorrespond
,sureminemment a notre s~voir purement speoulatif de oes
memes objets." Les degres du savoir, p.gg7.
6 Q2. £!i., p.7 g •

15
appropriate to this level aooording to the mind of
would be seemingly: "Is house a substanoe?

Thomas

Is house a genus?"

Or, in terms of our present matter: "Is society" an
!!? etc." 7

S?~

~

ration-

The question of the va~ue of a form of government

..

.;"

has its earliest possible entrance at the first division of
practical knowledge.

It is only at this level that the ulti-

mate end begins to play its part as Rrinoiple; g

henoe it i8

only here that the question of better or best oan begin intelligibly to be asked.
Now, as Karitain notes, it is fundamental to a true conception of the order of praotioa1 knowing to conoeive the
whole order as embodying a continuity9with the prudential
judgment:
Because practical knowledge is
as it were, a continuous movement

--------------7 This is the answer given (as we think, erroneously) by
Father I. Th. Esohmann, O.P.: IKais en thomisme e11e est
bien un lens rationis.'H in'Oompte Rendu', Bulletin thomiste
V (192g), p.710. Of. the similar opinion of J. Stepa, RLe
oaraotere total de l"tat d l apres S. Thomas d'Aquin,· Studia'
Gnesnensia, .III (1935"), pp. 4-29-441. The view we take of
what kind of reality sooiety is has been expressed by Father
William Ferree, S.M., The !2i Qt Social Justice, Washington,
Oatho1io University, 1943A pp. 166 et seq. It is based on
S.T., Iallae, q.7, a.1,0.
•
g Tprincipum autem tot ius ordinis in mora1ibus est finis u1timus qui ita se habet in operativis siout principum indemonstrabile in speoulativie." i-!., Iallae, q.72, a.5; Of.
Iallae, q.73, a.3; ibid., ad 3um; Iallae, q.90, a.1. See
Ohar1es J. O'lei1, "The Unity of the Moral Order," The lew
Soholastioism, XV (194-1), pp_ 2g0-2g3.
-----9 H... non pas d' essenoe maie de tendanoe ou de direction ....
Maritain, Les degree du savoir, p.ggg.

16
of thought which moves down
towards the placing of the concrete aot in existenoe, its
practical character, present
from the beginning, becomes
progressively intensified, becoming entirely dominant in
prudence: there it. ,.pgu1fs
the whole; and while the prudential judgment always involves
knowing, its proper truth does
not oonsist in knowing that
which is, but rather in directing that which ought to be done.

.'

10

According to Karitain, there is a three-fold division to be
made in the practical order of knowing: speculatively-practical; practically-practical, and prudential.
It is the function of speculatively-practical knowledge
to regulate action from afar,
and henoe to aot upon the will
~ afar by the knowledge it~
self. In view of this end, it
organizes in a praotioal oontext the matters with whioh it
deals and it disoovers in them
the ontological artiou1ations
related to aotion, adapting to
its praotioa1 purpose a oonoeptual equipment of modes of defining and judging still typioa11y speou1ative. 11
It is this type of knowledge whioh Aristotle oa11s praotica1

.

philosophy; it includes ethios, "eoonomios', po1itioa1
phi1o sophy , eto. 12

In this division belongs also moral theology,

10 Ibid., p. g79.
11 Ibid., p. g79 - gSO.
12 Ibid., p. 6~0.

17
in the sense that the Ia IIae and the IIaIIae

~f

the·'Summa

of St. Thomas are moral theology. 13
Olaiming to base his proposal on the prinoiples ot
st. Thomas, 14 Karitain (and Yves ,Simon 15 after him) wants
to introduoe between the speoulatively-praotioal and the
prudential 16

la fourth dimension". 17

This is the level

...... ------------13 Not therefore moral theology in the sense of St. Alphonsus
Liguori. Of. HAinsi dans beauooup de taoultes de theologi.
on a ete amene a ajouter au oours de theologie morale speoulative, ou lion explique les sujets trait~s par saint
Thomas dans la IaIIae et la IIaIIae, un oours de theologie
morale pratique oonQue du iOint' de vue de la theologie de
saint Alphonse de Liguori.
~., p. g92, n.l·.
Itt 'The distinction between speoulatively-praotioal moral
knowing and the praotioally-praotioal moral soienoes seems
to me solidly based on St. Thomas' prinoiples, though, so
far as I know, St. Thomas never explioitly formulat·ed it.
His own plan of thought was that of speoulativesoienoe
and speoulatively-praotioal sOienoe. u Karitain, Soienoe
~ Wisdom, ,p. l3g , n.2.
,
15 Yves Simon, Oritique de la oonnaissano, morale,. Paris, ~
Desolee, 1934, pp. 53 et seq.
16 "Entre la prudenoe et Ie savoir speoulativement pratique
nfy a-t-il pas un zone de oonnaissanoe intermediaire?'Oui,
repondons-nous en explioitant les prinoipes de saint Thomas, olest la soienoe pratique au sens etroit du mot, disons
Ie -savoir prati uement pratique. 1I Maritain, ~ degree
du savoir, pp. 23-624.
17 r ... il y a dans le monde lu1-meme de lfespr1t des differenoiat10ns struoturales et une d1vers1t' des dimensions
qulil importe avant tout de reoonna!tre, et lIon ne saurait
eviter
des malentendus graves qu'en prenant soin drassigner
,
a ohaque ,type de pensee sa situation exaote dans oette
sorte de topique transoendentale. Les differenoes dont
nous parlons ioi oonoernent la 'quatri'eme dimension,' selon
laque11e llesprit diversi!ie ses valeurs de oonnaissanoes
au grade ses finalites propres." Maritain, Les degres
dusavoir, p. 626.

6

/

\

of the practically-practioal sciences. 19

These sciences

differ from the speculatively-practical sciences by -the
mode of defining and conceptualising and their
ways of constructing conoepts." 19

~

•• typical

This knowledge is science

.~

Beoause, if it is much more
particularized than moral
theology or ethios, if it
considers oases in detail,
it still nonetheless ,mbraces
as its proper object, the
universal and the reasons
of being. 20
But its mode is different from that of the speculativelypractical:
The mode, practioal ~ oompositive not only with regard
to the oonditiqns of the objeot
known but also with regard !£
the very struoture of the means
of apprehending ~ judging,
does not oharacterize only pru"
denoe, whioh immediately regulates the act to be done hio et
nunc by a judgment and a command
appropriate to the absolute
individual~zation of the con"
crete case; it characterizes
also (though to a lesser degree)
a science of human action whioh,
different from prudence, has
for its object to o~ganize universal truths and which nevertheless proceeds no longer per
~-------~--~~-~

19 On the differenoe between the expressions "speculativopractical' and "practico-praotioal" and the expressions
·speculatively-praotioal" and "practically-praotical",
see Simon, S2. £!i., pp. 53-5~ and gO-gl.
19 Karitain, Science and Wisdom, p. 13g.
20 Maritain, Les degres du savoir, p. 62~.

principia remota operationis
as does moral philosophy (which
this scienoe presupposes) but
per prinoipia proxima operationis. 21

.'

19

In this division belong the works of "the great intuitives,

.

;;. .,;"

from Montaigne and Pascal to Nietzsohe, from Shakespeare to
Racine and Baudelaire, from Swift or Meredith to Balzac and
Dostoievsky."

22

Here likewise be~ng the moral teaohing

of St. Alphonsus Liguori and the case-studies of moralists
coming after him. 23
An adequate division of the practioal order of knowing

would apparently, then, have three levels: speculatively"
praot'ioalj praotically-practioal, and prudential.

It will

be our task in the remainder of our thesis to oollooate the
various treatments by st. Thomas of the problem of the best
form of government to what we conoeive to be their proper
levels in the praotioal order of knowing.

21 ~., p. g92.
22 ~., p. 626. 23 Of., ibid., p. g92, no. 1, and Soienoe
pp. 144-145.

~

Wisdom,

.~

OHAPTER III
THE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT: THE SPEOULATIVELY...

...

PRAOTIOAL OONSIDERATION
.
.,

As St. Thomas pOints out in the beginning of his commentaries on the fourth book of Aristotle's Politics, the political philosopher has to consider a wide range of topics:
It is evident that it belongs
to this same sCience, namely,
political sCience, to consider
which is the best form of government. This latter is that
which is especially desirable
and which is willed unless
there be some extrinsic impediment •••• Also it behooves the
political philosopher to consider which is the best form
of government in view of certain conditions. 1
The political philosopher's task does not stop at this point:
Likewise, it pertains to the
political philosopher to consider which form of government
is best in view of conditions,
and those not ideal conditions
but conditions which are not
unqualifiedly good •••• Besides
all these things the political
philosopher considers which
form of government is fitting
for which commonwealth. 2

.................. _----- .. _-- ...1
2

Oomm. in Pol., IV, 1.
Ibid. - -

-

20

21
In discussing the problem of the best form of

gover~nt

we

are faced with a complex question.
For st. Thomas politia or respublica oonnoted the organization of government and its personnel. 3 Kore than this,

.

however, it is the form of the civ\fas; 4
tas to be that which it is. 5

it makes the £!!!-

Government is a necessity for

social life. 6
st. Thomas was aware that the forms of government are
numerous in variety:
The diversity of governments
derives first of all from the
diversity of ends and then
from the diversity of ways of
. regarding the end ••.• Because
peoples ohoose diverse ends
or ohoose the same end in different ways and pursue the end
through various means, they
make diverse ways of life and
oonsequently diverse forms of
government. For diverse ways
of living are diverse forms

3 Of. the numerous definitions in the Oomm. in Pol.: "Ordo

f

rinci~antium"

(IV,12); gordo dominantium in civitate"
III,6); "ordo principatuum in civitate B (IV,l); "ordinatio civitatis quantum ad omnes principatus, sed praeoipue
quantum ad maximum prinoipatum" (III,5), eto.
4 Of. such phrases as the following: "ordo civitatis".
(IV,lO); "vita oivitatis" (~.); "ordo inhabitantiUm
in civitate" (III,7); "communioatio 01vium" (III 2), etc.
5 Of. "mutata politia, non remanet eadem 01vitas· tIII,2);
"cessante republioa, cessat oivitas· (IV,lO).
6 "So01alis vita mu1torum esse non posset nisi aliquis
praesideret, qui ad bonum commune intenderet." S.T., la,
q.96, a. 4.
- -

22

of government.

7

At the supreme level of the order of practical knowing, he
sets about introducing some sort of olassifioation.

There

are many classifications, but two sets of divisions emerge

.

as principal.

One of these is the·t~aditional tripartite

double series of forms of rule and their oorruptions, inherited from Plato and Aristotle!

monaichy -- tyranny; aristoo-

racy -- oligarohy; republic -- democracy. g

The principle

of division in this classification is ohiefly the number of
governors involved, although it ought to be noted that qualitative oonsiderations playa part also. 9 There is reason
to oonsider this olassification as of secondary importance
in the political thought of st. Thomas.
lor more fundamental and more in acoord with the constant procedure of Thomist practioal philosophy is the
sifioation by reason of ends. 10

clas-~

For St. Thomas, the ends

which serve as principles of forms of government come essentially to three:

virtue, wealth and freedom.

~~-~---------~~

7 Pol., VII, 6.
g 017 In Ethic., VIII, 10; Pol., II, 7; III, 6; IV, 3, etc.
9 Cf., for example, Pol., IV, 11, where in oonnection With
oligarohy and democracy St. Thomas denies that number is
the only distinction: "In prima proponit quod per se determinantur libertate et divitiis et per accidens multitudine et paucitate ••• " Also, Pol., III,6: "Necesse est
enim quod distinguantur politiae secundum diversitatem
dominantium."
10 "Diversitas rerumpublicarum primo est ex diversitate finis,
deinde ex diverso modo se habendi ad ipsum ••• • f2!., VII,6.

23
In distributive justioe, the
more of the common goods accrue
to a person, the greater the
power he has in the community.
low in an aristocratic community the power is distributed
according to virtue; in an oli"
garchic community, ~~ording to
wealth; in a.democratic community, according to freedom; and
in other types of community,
according to some other principle. 11
•
We can thus speak of three principles of forms of government:
the aristocratic principle, the oligarchic, and the democratic.

The classification, however, is not yet complete.

the first·place we must add to our list monarchy.

In

From one

aspect, monarchy and aristocracy belong to the same genus;
they both are 'according to virtue.' 12

But when the impor-

tant consideration of unity, which we are soon to discuss,
is taken into account, the difference between monarchy and
aristocracy widens.
per

~

.~

"Monarchy and the aristocratic state are

contraries; for they intend diverse ends and the one

corrupts the other.' 13

In the second place we shall have to ,

include in our list a form of governance in which the end is
the individual good sought at the expense of the common good.
-

--------------~

11 S.!., IIallae, q.6l, a.2; cf. also, ~., IV,2 and IV,7.
12 TSicut assumitur princeps secundum virtutem in statu optimatum, sic in regno." And further along: "Regnum est
institutem secundum statum optimatum." Pol., IV, 7.
13 Pol., V, 10.

This is tyranny.

Sinoe, however, its end is so

oppos~d

to

the true good of the community, tyranny is only improperly
to be called a form of government.
The full Thomist olassification seems to be that which

.....,

is given in compact form in the Summa Theo1ogica:
Human laws are distinguished
according to the diverse forms
of government of statts. One
of these, aocording to the Philo sopher, is mona.rohy, when, namely, the state is governed by one
man ••• ; another form of rule is
aristooracy, that is, the rule
of the best men or of the nobles
••• ; another form of rule is oligarohy, that is the rule of a few
rioh or powerful. men ••• ; another
form of rule is that of the people, and this is oa11ed demooracy
••• ; another is the tyrannioa1
form of rule, which is altogether
oorrupt. 14These 'are what might be oa11ed the "simple" types of rule;

.,..

tha,t is, eaoh of these -has its own proper principle, and eaoh
is irreduoib1e to the other.

It is true that St. Thomas adds

to this list another regimen, the Imixture of those forms," 15 ,
but, as we shall see, consideration of this form belong.s to
a level lower along the line of practical knowirig.
Here, we should perhaps note before prooeeding to discuss

14- S.T., lalla8, q.95, a.4-.
__
15 TEst etiam aliquod regimen ex istis commixtum quod est
optimum." Ibid.

25
st. Thomas's judgment on the respective value of the

~imple

regimes, that two other sets of distinctions are to be found
in the Commentary

~

the Politics.

These distinctions regard

..

modes of government rather than forms properly so called. 16
The first set of distinotions

i~

.,;,

ooncerned with 'the politi-

oal regimen' and 'the royal regimen'.

17 The political reg-

imen differs from the royal in the element of constitution,
as already noted, IS
free and equal 19

and in that it is found where men are

and in that the multitude has the right

of choosing and reprimanding the governors. 20

The second

distinction of mode in governance is that between 'the dominative" and lithe political'.

The dominative is __ that in which

the governor is the master of his subjects, 21
..__ .. v.e_ .. _.-__ ........

16 See t Demongeot,

.QR.. ~.,

in which the

pp. '-1-2 and lj.lj..

17 ·Civitas autem duplici regimine regitur, SCilicet, politr:

IS

19

20

21

co et regali. Regale quidem est regimen quando ille qui
civitati praeest habet plenariam potestatem. Politicum
autem regimen est quando ille qui praeest habet potestatem
coarctam secundum aliquas leges civitatis.' Pol., I,l.
'Hic loquitur de principatu politico secundum-quod politi- ,
cum distinguitur aregali." ~., I,5.
Ibid.'
ipolitica est principatus liberorum et aequalium; unde commutantur personae principantes et subjectae propter aequalitatem et constituuntur etiam principatus vel in uno vel
in diversis officiis.· ~., I, 5.
•
lIn civilibus principatibus transmutantur personae principantes et subjectae; qui enim sunt in officio principatus
uno anno, subditi sunt alio ••• N ~. I, 10. "In aliqua
politia non expedit multitudinem habere potestatem in eligendo et corrigendo, sicut in regno ••• ; sed in politica
ubi multitudo est aequalis, expedit." Pol., III, 10.
"Est quidem principatus dominativus in-quo princeps est
dominus subditorum." 12l., III, 3.

26
subjeots are as slaves, 22

and in whioh the governor.$eeks

only his own individual interest. 23

This mode of government

is either tyranny, when the domination of the governor is imposed by foroe, or despotism, when the domination is aooepted
voluntarily. ~4

.

The politioal mod; tas politioal is used in

terms of' this distinotion, i.e., as opposed to dominative) is
that in whioh the subjeots are dealt.with as free men, 25
equals of the governor, 26

as

and are directed to their proper

good. 27
We may now ask what St. Thomas thought of the respeotive
value of the "simple" types of rule, whioh we have taken to
be his prinoipal classification.

Here it will be in order to

put down the criterion aocording to which St. Thomas judges

...... .,., .. _------_ ... -..
22 "Oportet quod ille qui est simplioiter bonus oivis soiat
et prinoipari et subjioi prinoipatui, soilioet non domin~
tivo qui est servorum, sed politico qui est. liberorum."Ibld
23 "Duplex est prlnoipatus, unus quidem qui prinoipaliter esrad bon~ princlpantis, propter autem bonum subditi seoundum acoidens; alius autem est qui principaliter est propter aliquod bonum subditorum, vel alicujus oommunis prinoipanti et subjecto, et oonsequenti propter utilitatem
,
prinoipantis." fQ.l., VII, 10. "Haeo enim est differentia
inter dominativum prinoipatum et oivilem, quia prinoipans
prinoipatu dominativo prinoipatur per se propter utilitatem subditi, et e oontrario est di oivill." Pol., VII, 10.
24 "In il10 prinoipatu [despotioo] subditi subjICruntur 4yrannO,voluntarie, quia inclinantur ad subjioiendum tall prlncipatui, slcut in prinoipatu barbarorum." Pol., IV, 9.
25 "Politioa est principatus eorum qui sunt 11beri seoundam
naturam, despotiqa autem eat principatus servorum." ~.,

I, 5.

26 "Est quidam prinolpatus seoundum quem aliquisprinoipatur
non sicut dominus servis, sed siout liberis et sibi aequalibus, et hio est oivilis pr~ncipatus." Pol., III, 3.
27 Cf. Pol., VII, 10, and VII, 11. See n. 23, above.

27
the best form of governance.

His oriterion may be

p~sented

in the following few citations:
The, goodness of a thing is dis- '
cerned from its relation to the
end. 2g -- Something is said
to be good insofar ~~ it is perfect. 29 -- The best state is
determined by the best end. 30 -The best form of government is
that according to which the state
governs and lives bes;. 31
Which of the simple forms of government is the best?
There is'a statement in the beginning of the fourth lecture
of the Oommentary on the sixth book of the Politics, which
while it is probably not from the hand of St. Thomas himself, 32
question:

seems succinctly to summarize his answer to this
"The best form of government speaking absolutely

is monarchy, in whic~ one man holds the power."

St. Thomas

in several places offers monarchy as the best form of goverI\:ll
ment; the principal re'ason for his selection is in accord
with his criterion -- peace is the end of

gover~~ent

and the

best cause of unity is that which is itself one.
The best form of rule for a multitude is that it should be ruled
by one man. This is evident from

2g

~.,

IV, 11.

29 I.!., 'la, q.5, a·5.
30 fQl., VII, 10.

31 Ibid.
32 Only the first four books seem to have been written by
St. Thomas. Of. Demongeot, ~. 2!!., p.15.

,

the end of rule, which is peace.
For peace and the unity of his
subjec·ts is the end of the ruler.
But one man is a more fitting
cause of unity than many men a.re; 33

.'

The same idea is expressed in the Summa Theologica:
Governance is nothi~~other than
the direction of those governed
to an end, which is 80me good.
But unity pertains to the ratio
of goodness, as Boeth~us proves
from this, that as aIr things
desire good so also they desire
unity, without which they oannot
be. Each thing insofar as it is,
to that extent is one. Whence
we see that a thing resists its
division as muoh as it can and
tha.t the dissolution of anything
proceeds from a defect in that
thing. And therefore that towards which the intention of one
governing a multitude is directed
is unity, i.e., peace. But a
caus! p~r ~ of unity is one.
For 1t 1S obvious that a plurali ty o·f things cannot unite and
bring to~ether many things, unless the plurality of things is
itself united in some way. But
that which is per ~ one can be
more readily the cause of unity
than can many things united. Hence
a multitude is better governed by
one man than by many men. 3~
Another argument for monarchy is that it most resembles the
divine governance of the world:

"Monarchy is the best form

of government and the most divine and the most in accord

.. -.... - ... -.. ------....
33 Contra Gent.,. IV, 76.
3~ 1-!., la, q.103, a·3·

29
with right reason." 35
This, then, is St. Thomas's conclusion at the top-level
of the practical order of knowing, where the mode is most
speculative: 36

"Among right forms of rule monarchy is the

best and most right of the forms

01 iovernance."

is "the rule and the measure of the others"; 3g

37

Monarchy

eo much so,

that it gives its name-to the specia\ ratio of prudenoe involved in any other form of government. 39

It is, according

to St. Thomas, the form of regimen that would have obtained
if man had remained in the state of innocence. 40
But a.s we have
ohapter, for

st.

al~eady

noted at the beginning of this

Thomas, the political philosopherls consid-

eration of the best form of government is to include not only
oonsideration of the best absolutely speaking but also con-

--------------Pol., IV, 1. Of. ~.T., Iallae, q.l05, a.l, ad 2um.
Y!Qognitio ••• practioa efficituJU per extensionem speculativae ad opus." ~ veritate, q.2, a.g. Of. S.!_, la,
q.79, a.11; ~. in De Anima, lib. III, lect. 15.
3Z ~., III, 13.
,
3o Ibid.
39 HRegnum inter alias politias est optimum regimen, ut dioitur~
Et ideo species prudentiae magis debuit denominari
a regno; ita tamen quod sub regnativa comprehendantur
omnia alia regimina recta, non autem perversa, quae virtuti opponuntur: unde non pertinent ad prudentiam."·
~.!., IIallae, q.50, a.1, ad 2um.
40 Of. In II ~., d. 44, q.1, a.3, sol. lor the compatibility of the inequality involved and the state of innocenoe, see St. Thomas's argumen~ by analogy with the oondition of the angels in S.l., la, q.9~, a.4, I.C. Of.
NEs sei noch hervorgehoben naoh Thomas auoh im Stande der
Unsohuld die J'orm der Regierung gewesen lein wf:trde'. It
.
Maller, 2£. £!i., p.g5.

3

3~

o

30
sideration of the best in view of conditions. ~l

In .is view

of the requirements of the question, "it is necessary to consider in the beginning what sort of thing can be done and
what sort of thing can be maintained over a period of time."

.

He was well aware that the best fofm~absolutely speaking
would be the object of volition only on condition that there
was no extrinsio impediment.

~2

•

Asa theologian, St. Thomas could not, of course, share
an optimism about the natural goodness of man such as Jean
Jacques Rousseau was later to introduce into political thinking.

He knew that because of the effects of Original Sin,

"more men follow the inclinations of sensitive nature than
follow the order of reason." ~3
on political life:

He knew the effect of this

·romes, that is, the inclination toward

sensuality, does not incline to the common good, but rather

.~

to the private good." ~~ He recognized as well the effects
for many men on the all-important prudence:

"many men there

are in whom prudence of the flesh is dominant."

4s

He was thus well prepared for the possibility that a

--------------~l

~2

~3
~4
~5

Cf. the passage already cited from Pol. IV, 1.
•
"Haec [optima politia] autem est quae maxime desideratur,
et est secundum voluntatem, si non sit impedimentum per
aliquod extrinseoum." ~.
Iallae, q.71, a.2, ad 3um.
Iallae, q.91, a.6, obj. 3.
Iallae, q.93, a.6, obj. 2.

,

31
king, whom it behooves to possess perfeot virtue, 46 ·might
nullify the advantages whioh aoorue to kingship per

~

as a

souroe of unity by his laok of experienoe, stupidity or weakness. ~7

And so st. Thomas desoends from the oonsideration

.

of the question of the best form

01 government

on the top-

level of praotioal knowledge to a point somewhat lower on the
line that runs through this order of.knowing.

His purpose

is to make a general oonsideration of the diffioulties likely
to be faoed by a regime.

This we might oall the oonsidera-

tion of the best form of government in view of oonditions.
In general, the dangers to be met by a form of government are two:

degeneration into tyranny and

Tyranny oan arise in any form of rule:

re~olution.

"rrom a demooratio

state whioh is too proud there arises tyranny;
from the power of a few." ~g

similarly,

But tyranny would seem most

likely to eventuate from monarohy, whose proper oorruption
it is:
By reason of the great power

.. ---_
~6

....

---------

"Ille qui prinoipatur ••• oportet quod habeat perfeotum
virtutem moralem." ~., I, 10. "Oportet quod rex •••
differat a subditis secundum naturam in quadam magnitudine bonitatis.' Ibid. "Regem, aut solum nomen regis
oportet habere, et-aeQuivooe, aut talem esse propter
exoellentiam virtutDset boni universaliter." 121.,IV,1.
~7 "Ea quae gubernantur ab uno, a se invioem non dissentiunt,
nisi propter imperitiam aut insipientiam aut impotentlam
gubernantis." S.l., la, q.l03, a.3, obj. 2.
4-a l.2.!., IV, 10.)

f

oonoeded to a king, monarohy
easily degenerates into tyranny,
unless he to whom suoh power is
oonoeded possesses perfeot virtue •••• Perfect virtue, however, .
is to be found in few men. 49
The second general diffiou1ty to
the possibility of revolt.

be~~aken

.'

into account is

In order that a form of govern-

ment be maintained it is necessary that the governed be satisfied:
In order that a form of government may be maintained, it is
necessary that all parts of the
state want the form to exist
and that the form provide suffioient1y for each ,part of the
state so that that part oan
preserve its status. 50
The basic cause of revolution is dissatisfaction with the
inequalities which are, or appear to be, involved in the
various forms of government. 51 . Under monarchy, the "vir-

,..

tuous men' other than the king may become restive:
If one very virtuous man dominates, there will be many more
who are not honored with the
dignity of rule. But this is
not fitting. 'or from this
there follow dissensions and
disturbanoes. 52
I

------- .. ------49 !.1., IaIIae, q.105 1 a.1, ad 2um.
50 fQ!., II, 14. Cf. "In politia reote ordinata quilibet
d11igit statum et gradum proprium et gradum a1terius. N
.f.2!.., III, 12.
51 qf. 12l., V, 1.
52 Pol., III, g. Of. l2!., 111, 11.

I

33
In the aristooratio state, the non-members of the aris'tocracy constitute the source of trouble:
If only the virtuous have the
power of rule, all the others
will be laoking in honor, because they do not attain the
honor of offioe, foroffioes
are honors ••.• But this is not
fitting; for it is the oause of
dissension. 53
When the oligarohioal prinoiple is it effeot, the situation
is muoh the same:
It seems a terrible thing in
no wise to share in honors ••••
[Those who do not share in
honors] will think themselves
dishonored, and, sinoe they
are numerous and poor, there
will follow sedition and strife
in the state, and that is terrible. 54
In view of this general difficulty, i.e., at this level
of speoulatively-praotioal oonsideration, St. Thomas says:
"That form of government is best whioh is most laoking in
sedition and strife.' 55

Weighting the problem of the best

form of government with this and the other difficulties we
have discussed, St. Thomas might be said to be making a fresh
approach to the solution.
The first step in view of the difficulties met with at

--------------55 3 Pol., III, g. Cf. Pol., V, 6.
4- Pol., III, 9.
~., IV, 10, prope finem.

55

f

this lower level is to examine the simple types of fo1ms of
government other than monarchy.

The purpose is to discover

what advantages each has to offer.
on the highest level of

Granted the 'superiority

considerati~n
;

....

of monarchy by reason

of its unity, do the other forms offer any remedy to the difficulties which may make pure monarchy unrealizable?
In his Commentary on the third Qpok of the Politics,
st. Thomas discusses one of the advantages peculiar to aris"
tocracy.

It is that of providing a better source of judg-

ments than the single person of a king could ever proffer.

A plurality of men provide better observation than one alone56
They are less susceptible to the influence of passion in
making their judgment. 57

They are able to see more of the

question being discussed. 5g

In addition to this advantage,

government by the optimates carries.with it something of a
safeguard against the danger of tyranny:

~

HA plurality of

good men are more difficult to pervert and corrupt than one
good man. 1t 59
..-........ ..

-_

-_ _--_
\

I

...

Ulnconveniens est dicere quod unus dU9bus oc~lis et duabus
auribus melius percipiat quam multi multis auribus et
multis oculis." Pol., III, 15.
57 "Plures magis sunt indifferentes respectu passionum turbantium et pervertentium judicium rectum, quam unus sive
pauci." Ibid.
5g "Plures consiliantes super aliquo plura possunt videre
quam unus, ergo manifestum est quod unus compara.tus ad
plures deterior est in judioando." Pol., III, 14.
59 12l., III, 14.
56

,.
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Aristocracy inoorporates another advantage; it
distributive justioe.

~alizes

"In the rule of the nobles there is a

distribution of the power of rule acoording to the dignity
of virtue~' 60

As a matter of faot, it is only in aristoora-

cy that the virtue of the good
ooinoide. 61

.
..
man and
.",;

the good citizen fully

That distributive justioe be realized is impor-

tant to the peace. 62
With regard to demooracy, it seems that for St. Thomas
the principal advantage it prooures is the satisfaction of
the citizens.

In the text which will be a subjeot of exten-

sive consideration in our next chapter, St. Thomas says:
••• with regard to a good ordering of powers in some state or
people, two things are to be observed: of these, one is that
all have some part in the power
of rule; for by this means peaoe
is preserved among the people,
and they all like and abide by
this ordering ••• 63
It should perhaps be remarked that St. Thomas did not share

----_ .. _-_ .... _--60 Pol., IV, 7.
61 Tftem in sola ista republica [sol. optimatum] idem est
optimus vir et civie optimus simpliciter." 1!Q1., IV, 6.
62 •••• cum unusquisque secundum unam dignitatem debea~
recipere de bonis oommunibus, quando non recipiunt seoundum quod existimant se dignos, faciunt seditionem in
civitate et mutant rempublicam: ex hoc enim quod non
recipiunt seoundum existimationem quam habent de se,
videtur eis, quod fiat eis injustum, et quod contemnantur. Ista autem causa sunt dissensionis.' 1!Q1., V, 1.
63 1.1., Iallae, q.105, a.l.

f

our modern preoccupation with political freedom. 64 Hence
it is only by anachronism and distortion that he can be made
a supporter of the contemporary enthusiasm for the democratio
form, as is sometimes done. 65
;9

'4;

As we have seen, st. Thomas, in his consideration in
view of conditions, takes account of the difficulties and
the advantages connected with each
government.
he says:

o~

the simple types of

After an examination of each type successively,

•••• the same difficulties turn up all the time. H 66

Does this consideration alter our answer to the question of
what is the best form of rule?

Yes; for let us remember that

here
••• we have not to speak of that
best form of rule which is willed
and chosen absolutely. We have
rather to speak of the best life
possible for the more men and
states and of forms of government
which most states can achieve. 67
In view of the difficulties, St. Thomas recommends that the
advantages of the different simple forms be combined:

"It

... -------------- ..
6~

See the well-taken remarks of Jacques Maritain on this
point in Freedom in the Modern World (New York, Scribner's, 1936),. pp.~=4b; 54-60; 71-73. Cf. Demongeot,
~. cit., pp.104 et seq.
65 Cf., for example, Father Moorehouse F.X.Millarls foreword
to his James Wilson and the Natural Law Basis of Positive
Law (New York, Fordham, 1937).
66 l2!., III, g.
67 Pol., IV, 10.

,
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will help to mix the aforementioned forms of rule in _he
states •• 6g

In this oombination 'one form of government is

tempered by being mixed with another, and less ground for
sedition is provided." 69

We may take as st. Thomas's answer

on this level of oonsideration:

...,
..
'There

is some form of rule

whioh is a mixture of these [sol. monarohy, aristooraoy, oligarohy, demOoraoy];

this is best.- ~O

Thus, we see that St. Thomas gives two answers to the
question, -What is the best form of government?·

The answers

oorrespond to the level of praotioal knowledge at which the
question is posed.

At the highest level (absolute oonsider-

ation) the decision is in favor of monarohy.

At a somewhat

lower level (consideration with oonditions in view) where
possible diffioulties of realization are taken into oonsideration in a general way, the answer suggests a mixture -- .,...
a mixture of the elements in the simple forms that are required by the ciroumstances.
But as St. Thomas says:

..

~-

.. -----------

19l.,
Ibid.
70 1.1.,

6g
69

'Over and above all those things ,

II,

7.

Iallae, q.95, a.4. That this solution is given in
view of the diffioulties is olear from the discussion of
them in artiole 1 of this question. Of. Billuart's commentary on a.l: "Leges humanae sunt necessariae non
quidem simpliciter et absolute, sed sio, ut attenta hominum pervioaoia, oorruptlone, et pronitate in malum, sine
legibus humanis, neo respublica paoem habere et oonservare posset."

the politioal philosopher likewise oonsiders whioh
government is suitable for whioh state." 71

fo~m

of

This latter

type of oonsideration seems to us to belong to a lower di-

.

mension of the praotioal order of knowing,
namely, the prao.
tioally-praotioal.

~

We further believe that there is a pas-

sage in which St. Thomas makes such a oonsideration.
matter will be disoussed in the

foll~ing

This

ohapter.

I

--~~-----------

71

~.,

IV, 1.

OHAPTER IV
A PRAOTIOALLY-PRAOTIOAL
OONSIDERATION

In discussing the respective value of the simple forms
of government, Marcel Demongeot

rema~s:

"It is very foolish

to wish to make of st. Thomas at all costs a royalist, for
example, or a democrat." 1

It would, it seems to us, be

equally inconvenient to identify him with any partioular combination of simple types. 2

As is said in the Oommentary ~

the Politics, there is a oonsiderable variety of possible
combinations. 3 And there is the statement of St. Thomas
himself, that the combination of oligarohy

a~d

demooraoy

which is "politia without qualification" or 'republio, as
this name is understood in ordinary usage" 4

(and the

~--~--~-------~

Demongeot,~. ~., p. 123.
As Demongeot does in reference to the "politia bene oommixta ex regno ••• ex aristooratia ••• et ex demooratia
••• " disoussed in IaIIae, q. 105, a.l. This is for his
interpretation "le regime modele" aooording to st. Thomas.
Of. g£. oit., p. l4S et seq.
•
3 "Oontingit autem oommixtiones Tel oombinationes istarum
fieri, puta quod aooipiatur oonsiliativum unius et judioium alterius, et s1c de a11is; et seoundum hoo oonting1t
d1versimode m1soeri respubl1oas •••• Istae en1m partes
divers1mode oomb1natae faoiunt diTersitatem rerumpublicarum." Pol., VI, 1.
4 Of. fQ!., IV, 7 and 10.

1

2

39

,

4-0
oombination of oligarohy and aristooraoy whioh is olosely
related to it 5 but whioh is diffioult of realization 6)
"are best and possible to more states and men." 7 And this
latter is oertainly different from Demongeot's "mixed regime
properly so oalled." g

• .;,

It is oustomary to oite the text from the Summa Theologioa, Iallae, q.105, a.l, as most rePlesentative of what
st. Thomas thought the best form of rule to be. 9

This re-

sponse of St. Thomas to the question, "Whether the Old Law
made fitting disposition with regard to rulers," might well
be oalled the oommon plaoe in this matter.

The body of the

artiole reads as follOWS:
I answer that in the matter of
--.-

~

................ --.............

•••• manifestum est quod non multum distant." Pol., IV, 7.
o P§l., IV, 10.
,..
7 lid.
g see-above, note 2.
9 Cf. Demongeot, 22. oit., p.9: ·Or il est un texte o~, de
l'avis de tous, saint Thomas a exprime oette pensee de
fason partioulierement preoise et oomplete, et qui par la
rev~t une importanoe toute speoiale pour l'intelligence de ,
la question eto.'; Gilson, Le Thomisme, p.~7: "Oe regime ne res semble guere aux monarohies absolues et fondees
sur le droit du sang qui se sont parfois reolamees de
ltautoritede saint Thomas dlAquin. Pour le deorire,
saint Thomas se tourne simplement vers ltAnoien Testament.
Il tire sa politique de ltEor.1ture et aussi dlAristote,
en un texte que nous devons oiter tout entier oomme un
exemple typique de oes dootrines dont, a lien oroire,
saint Thomas emprunte tout, et qui ntappartiennent oependant quia lui."; Alexander Passerin d'Entreves: The
Mediae1val Oontribution to Poli tioal Thought: Thomas
Aguinas, Karsilius of Padua, Richard Hooker (Oxford, 1939),
p.13 g ; J. Donat, S.J.: Ethioa Specialis (Innsbruck, 1927),
p. 165, etc.

the disposition of rulers in
some state or people, two things
must be oonsidered. One of these
is that everybody have a part in
the ruling; for by this peaoe is
preserved among the people and
all like, and all abide by, suoh
a set-up, as it is said. The
other thing to be loo~ed to is
the form of rule or the disposition of powers. Of this there
are different kinds, as the Philosopher tells us. Th~prinoipal
forms are monarohy, i~whioh one
man holds rule by reason of his
virtue; aristooraoy, that is the
rule of nobles, in whioh some few
men hold the power of rule by
reason of their virtue. Whenoe
the best disposition of rulers
in some state or realm is that
in whioh one man is made ohief
by reason of his virtue and he
presides over all; under him there
are some men who hold the power of
rule by reason'of their virtue;
and still suoh a power of rule
pertains to all, both beoause the
rulers oan be ohosen from all and
beoause the rulers are eleoted by
all. But suoh is every form of
rule well oomposed of monarohy,
inasmuoh as one presides; of aristooraoy, inasmuoh as many hold the
power of rule by reason of their
virtue; and of demooraoy, inasmuoh
as the rulers oan be seleoted from
the people and the eleotion of
rulers pertains to the people.
And this is what was set up by
divine law: Jor Koses and his
successors govern the people, ruling alone as it were over all -this is a kind of monarohy. Seventy-two elders were eleoted for
their virtue; for it is said in
Deut. I, verse 15: ~! took ~
of your tribes ~ wise ~ honorable, and I appOinted them rulers,

.'

,

and this was aristocratic. But
it was democratic that they were
elected from all the people; for
it is said in Exod. XVII1, 21:
Provide out of all the people
able ~,etc. Whence it is evident that the disposition of rulers which the Law o4deined was
best. 10
•

.'

"7

What shall we make of this passage?

The first thing to

be established, it would seem, is what St. Thomas is doing
here.
~

To us it seems clear that he is engaged in a theologi-

consideration.

Specifically, he is engaged in the or-

dinary theological task of seeking reasons of appropriateness
(rationes convenientiae). 11

This process involves seeking

to provide explanations of the fittingness of divine action.
In most cases this is done by bringing to bear what theology
knows of God on the particular instance under discussion.
Ordinarily, therefore, the gathering of reasons of appropri- ,..
ateness involves the exercise of the theological habit purely
and simply.

As such, the procedure would not be of direct

....-......... ......---- ..-..
~

10 i.!., IaIIae, q.105, a.l. The only variant reading noted
in the Leonine edition which would seem to have any possible influence on the interpretation is the Editio Romana
(likewise in the Codex Cameracensis) reading: 'Talis est
enim optima politia" for "Talis vero est omnis politla. M
11 Such would seem to be the import of the "Utrum convenienterM of the question of the article. (All four articles
are concerned with questions of this type.) In the light
of this, Demongeotts paraphrase of the question: "lsi
llorganisation gouvernementale donn6e aux Hebreux par la
loi divine etait bien la mell1eure,11I (~. £!l., p.9)
would seem a little forced.

philosophioal interest.
Sometimes it happens, however, that what is under disoussion is a matter whioh is "supernatural in mode only."
In other words, the agent is God, but the aotion is not suoh
in oonoept as to require God as agJnl.

In suoh a oase the

theologian makes an instrumental use of philosophioal truth 12
in his searoh for some, at least, of.the reasons of appropriateness.

This gives the philosopher an area in a question

of this type wherein he may legitimately philosophize.
Sinoe the text whioh we have cited is, in our view, of
the type just desoribed, we may press further our oonsidera"
tion of how the theologian works in suoh a situation.

It

would seem that the theologian tries to get as olose to the
oonditions of the oase he is studying as possible.

In a

sense, he tries to put himself insofar as he possibly oan in
God's position.

~

His effort will be to muster the best rea-

sons he oan in the hope that these will provide him with some
inkling of "what God had in mind" in operating as He did.
This would seem to be involved in the attempt to disoover how
~--------------

12

"The light of faith is different in kind from that ot
pure reason. But that does not prevent theology from
taking up in an instrumental way the knowledge provided
by reason (whioh thereupon oeases to be the soienoe of
pure reason) into a form of knowledge whioh tends to
resolve itself into the soienoe of the blessed."
J. Karitain, Soienoe ~ Wisdom, p. 203.

,

God's disposition of the matter was fitting.
another way:

To put tc

In such a procedure we would seem to have a

"case study", whioh is to say, the very type 13 'of what
Yaritain calls practically-practical knowledge.
NOW, as we see it, the text we9 flave under discussion
involves practically-practical knowing as much as any case
,

about Oletus and Rufina ever did.

If. so, the text will show

•

this chiefly by the way it is impregnated with consideration
of the conditions of the case. l~ It is our belief that the
whole article demands this interpretation.
In the first place, St. Thomas is aware of the historical period (under the Law 15) in which this form of regimen
was set up. 16

This is clear from the fact that the form

--------------13 Of. above, Ohapter II, note 23.
1 4 "[Le savoir pratiquement-pratique] est beaucoup parti- ~
cu1arisee que la theologie morale ou 1 t ethique, ••• el1e
considere le detail des cas •••• J. Yaritain, Les degres
du savoir, p.62~.
--15 Of. his division of human history into three periods:
ante legem; sub lege; sub gratia. S.T., IIallae, q.17~,
a.6.
16 This is by no means a negligible consideration in view
of st. Thomas's doctrine on the conditions that prevailed
under the Law. Of. particularly the principle which he
is constantly invoking in interpreting Genesis: -Kofses
rudi populo loquebatur, quorum imbeci11itati condescendens, i1la solum eis proposuit quae manifeste sensui a~
parent." S.!., la, q.6g, a.3. See also, ~.!., la, q.6l,
a.1, ad lum, etc. P. Rousse10t, S.J., gives an excellent
summary of St. Thomas's doctrine on the conditions under
the Law in Ltlntel1ectua1isme de saint Thomas (Paris,
Beauchesne, 1924), pp. 235 et seq.

,

. chosen was not monarchy, which for st. Thomas would have been
the form of governance if the Fall had not taken place.

17 He

has not forgotten or abjured his teaching elsewhere that monarchy is the best form of government.
his words in the second objection:

This is evident from

~

•••• the best ordering of
any state or people is that it should be governed by a·king. Mlg
A monarchy was not set up precisely because of the ten-

•

dency of the particular people involved to become tyrants:
••• the Israelites were particularly cruel and prone to
avarice; through these vices
especially do men fall into
tyranny. 19
The peculiar danger of revolts involved is evident
throughout the article.

In the beginning of the body of the

article, St. Thomas says in effeot that in oonsidering the
politioal set-up of some state or people two things must be

~

taken into account, viz., the end of the regimen (pax populi)
and the means to that end (species regiminis vel ordinatio
principatuum).

But, concerning the end of the .regimen, he

adds what, in our interpretation, is already the consideration of a type of condition, viz., a people difficult to
control; for he says:
--~------------

17 See above, Ohapter III, note ~O.
Loc. cit.; he confirms this in the reply. Of. also obj.5.
19 Loc. £11.,. ad 2um.
19

,

One of these is that eveverybody
have a part in the rulf_ing; for
by this peaoe is prese~erved among
the people and all like=e, and all
abide by, suoh a set-ugap, as it
is said. 20

......

.'

The immediate oontext abounds with

r~t~ferenoes

sity of the Israelites to revolt.

In a the reply to the seoond

objeotion, St. Thomas tells of God's

0

to the propen-

oonoession to the peo-

ple's demand for a king (hitherto witHwtheld beoause of

t~e

danger of tyranny, as already noted):
••• but later, and as : it were
indignantly, He oonoede.ed a king
at the request of the D people,
as is olear from what H He said
to Samuel: For they hanave not
rejeoted thee, but ~, • that I
should BQ! reign ~! them.
[I Kings, VIII, 7] 2:~1
In the third objeotion St. Thomas tel:ils us that the later
division of the kingdom, whioh Ahias • was ordered to make, 22 ,..
was visited upon that I people in
punishment for their m~ny dissensions, espeoially tluhose whioh
they initiated against u David the
just ••••

20

21
22

The referenoe is to Aristotle, Po:olitios, II, 9, l270b 19
et seq., where it is a question o:of the Jphoralty feature
of the Laoedaemonian oonstitutiono and its usefulness· in
maintaining oontentment among the ~ people. See above,
Chapter III, notes 52, 5" and 56.0.
Cf. 1:2.2.. oit., ad 5um:
••• unde e hoo dioebat Samuel ad
terrendum eos, ne regem peterent; ; sequitur enim: loluit
autem audire populus vooem Samuel:~is
I Reg., VIII,19 .H
III Reg., XI.

,

The oligarchical principle, which is absent from the mixed
regime as presented in this article, seems to have been advisedly excluded to remove a cause of revolt. 23
The foregoing considerations seem to make it clear that

.

as st. Thomas wrote this article hi Bad the special conditions of the Israelite people very vividly in view.
is another consideration, a verbal

o~e,

There

which is at least

persuasive of the particularity of the viewpoint taken. This
is the use of "some" in the two following phrases in the body
of the article:
I answer that in the matter of
the disposition of rulers in
some state or people, two things
must be considered •••• Whence
the best disposition of rulers
in some state or realm •••
We realize, of course, that nothing certain can be argued
from this usage.

It does, however, favor our

interpretation~

in the sense that an "all" or Hevery· here would embarrass it.
Since, in effect, we have here the study of a particular
case, the considerations are for us on the practically-

23 Cf., loc. £!i., ad

~um:
H••• et praecipue cum Dominus
prohiberet etiam in lege ne superabundarent [scl. principes] divitiis, aut magnifico apparatu; tum quia non
erat facile quin ex his in superbiam et tyrann1dem
erigerentur; tum etiam quia si principes non erant
multum divites, et erat laboriosus princ1patus, non
multum affectabatur a popularibuSj et sic tollebatur
seditionis materia. H Cf. also, ad 2um: " ••. et ad
avaritiam proni."

practical level.

What may therefore be concluded?

Tkat the

considerations retain some universality is taken for granted
in the theory of practically-practical knowing. ·24 The question is:

To what extent may we apply St. Thomas's consider-

ations in this article?
this:

In our in~e~pretation it comes to

In the first part of the body of the article, where

he is bringing considerations from tje speculatively-practical
level to bear on his problem ("Whence the best disposition
of rulers etc."

"But such is every [ale optima 25J form of

rule well composed etc."), the "best" is to be understood as
"best in view of oonditions." 26

In this sense the partiou-

lar form of a mixed regime, composed of monarchy, aristocraoy
and demoora.oy as elements, will be best wherever the ciroumstances require and allow this oombination.

In the last

sentence of the body of the artiole -- "Whenoe it is

evident~

that the disposition of rulers whioh the Law ordained was
best" -- the "best" is to be taken with the qual1f1oation
"in view of the particular oiroumstanoes obtaining among the

25
26

"[Le savoir prat1quement pratiqu~ ctest encore une science, parce que, si elle est beaucoup plus particularisee
que ;a theolog1e morale ou llethique, si elle considere
Ie detail des cas, c'est encore cependant en brassant,
comme son objet propre, de l'universel et des raisons
dtetre. u J. Maritain, Les degres du savoir, p.624. Cf.,
also, p.S92.
As we have noted above in note 10, the reading is doubtful.
See above, Chapter III, notes 1 and 2.

,

people under the Law."

Even here, of oourse, there

element of universality left:

i~an

A similar set-up would be

"best" wherever and insofar as these oiroumstances were approximated. 27
---~----------~

27 Before we pass to the final chapter, it seems in order to
give a brief consideration to two interpretations of the
locus communis (IIallae, q.105, a~l) ;which differ from our
own. The first of these is that of Etienne Gilson, Le
Thomisme, Ve ad., pp.~53 et seq. For Gilson, as we nave
already noted (see above, Chapter I, note 9), this article
is to be taken as a kind of explanation by st. Thomas of
what he means by monarchy. It seems clear, however, from
objection 2 and its reply, that the Divine ordination did
not set up a regnum in the beginning because of the tendencY,of the Israelites to tyranny. Gilson cites: "Est
etiam aliquod regimen ex istis commixtum, quod est optimum" from q.95, a.~. He then identifies this mixed form
with the one described in q.105, a.l: "11 est certain
, q~ le regimen oommixtum du texte precedent est celui que
decrit Sum. theol., IalIae, 105, 1, ad Resp. On lit, en
effet, dans oe dernier texte: 'Talis enim est optima
politia, bene commixta t " (Q2. £it., p.~57, notes 2 and 3).
But is this identification certain? In the text from q.9~
a.~, the antecedent of istis includes regnum, aristocratia, oligarohia, and democrati& (omitting tyrannioum).
In q.l05, a.l, the oligarchic element is omitted from the
mixed, seemingly on purpose (see above, note 23). For
oligarchy as an element of the mixed form, see above, Ohapter III, note 55, and above, this chapter, notes ~, 5, and
6. Further, Gilson says: III slagit ioi de l'Anoienne
Loi, mais n'oublions pas que saint Thomas y voit Ie type
meme dtune optima politia. Voir Ie Sed contra: 'Ergo per
legem populus fuit circa principes bene institutus" (Q2.
oit., p.~59, note 3). In the sense of type of best form
~government in that it exhibits the best adaptation to
the ciroumstances, we could conoede this. Suoh, however,
does not seem to be Gilson's meaning; of. " ••• Ie regime
politique institue selon la loi de Dieu est oertainement
le Meilleur de tous" (2£. cit., p.~7, note 3). -- Demongeot gives a succinot summary of his interpretation in Q2.
£!i., pp. 11-13· His points together with our oriticisms

f

50
It now remains for us to consider the last of
of practical knowing, namely, the prudential.

th~'levels

This will be

the burden of the next chapter •

.. --------------

.....

are as follows:
,
"1 0 ) II aborde la question a propos d'un cas particulier: celui des H6breux. Mais aussitot il s'en ecarte et,
pour resoudre ce cas particulier, stel~ve a une theorie
g~nerale.
La structure m~me de 1 t article 1e montre: Ie
titre pose la question pour les H~reux, mais Ie corps de
ltarticle ne contient pas la moindre consideration a eux
particuliere dans la description du regime mixte, et il
nten fait qulapres coup l'application a leur constitution.
C'est donc bien en philosophe, non en legis1ateur, que
saint Thomas traite Ie probleme, et Ie regime mixte n'est
pas seulement 1e meilleur r~ime souhaitab1e pour les
Hebreux, mais Ie meilleur· regime en g~nera1;" -- Our
view of this will be clear from our discussion in the text.
It might be pointed out, however, that in the solution of
any case, it is usual to prefix the principles according
to which the solution will be made, and that the principles
themselves are selected because they apply in casu.
H2 0 ) mais non d'une superiorite d'ordre-purement
speculatif. Oar il ne borne pas
etudier en elle-meme
et en pur metaphysicien la notion de regime politique. II
l'6tudie concretement, il tient compte des conditions gen*
erales des cites humaines, comme Ie montre des la premi~re
lecture notre texte, notamment: per hoc ~ conservatur
pax populi, et omnes talem ordinationem amant et custodiunt. C'est done Ie meilleur regime ~ fait, pratigue~;" -- We have already stated earlier that the specu1ati ve study of "Ie meilleur re'gime poli tique" does not
seem to have much meaning (see above, Chapter I, note 17).
For St. Thomas, political questions are questions in the
practical order of knowing (see above, Chapter III, notes
I and 2). As should by now be clear, our proposal is to
eliminate the so-called "speculative" consideration, -to
put the whole discussion within the practical order of
knowing, and to distinguish the different levels at which
the question is considered along the line that leads down
to the prudential.
"3 0 ) i1 est manifeste que l'intention de saint Thomas
est d'et~blir que la cons~itution donnee aux Hebreux etait
la plus digne dt~tre donnee par Dieu lUi-merne: etc." This

a

f

.'
is true.
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"40) enfin et surtout i1 faut tenir compte de ce que,
la Bible etant un livre inspire, tout ce qutelle contient
a une valeur exemplaire. Pour un chr6tien comme saint
Thomas, Ie seul fait qutune constitution est inscrite dans
la Bible la recommande dtune m~~ere ~minente au philosophe politique." Our view of this will be clear from the
text. -- To complete Demongeotts interpretation, we can
add his conclusion: "En un mot, Ie regime mixte [as described in Iallae, q.105, a.l] est aux yeux de saint Thomas
Ie regime mod~le· (Q£. cit., p.l~).

OHAPTER V

.'

PRUDENOE: THE END OF THE LINE

.. 4,

st. Thomas was seemingly not much concerned with the
foundation of new states as such and the selection of the
forms of government for them.

So fai as we are aware, he

nowhere explicitly says who would exercise the choice in such
a case.

It would, of course, be a mistake to associate with

him the problem that was to come to the fore in the days of
Bellarmine and Suarez; 1

as Mueller remarks, efforts to read

the Vertragstheorie into Aquinas have not as yet been successful. 2
Since the choice of form of rule is a matter concerning
the common good, it would seem that this decision will be
made by the whole multitude or by him who, by one title or
another, is charged with their care, for
To order ••• something to the
common good pertains either
to the whole multitude or to
someone who takes the place
of the whole multitude. 3
Of. James Brown Scott, Oatholic Sources of American Democracy, (Ohicago, National Oatholic Alumnirederation, 1937).
2 Mueller,~. cit., pp. 7-10.
3 ~.!., IaIIae, q.90, a.3. It is here a question of law.
the ~ gerens is "persona publica, quae totius multitudinis curam habet." (idem.)

1
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st. Thomas does not show us the multitude

setti~'up

a

form of government, but he does present them as at work on
a related matter, as doing something related to the common
good.

This is their "making", abolishing and interpreting

of law by means of custom. ~

g

.

This eiample is instructive and

pertinent; it will repay us to give it a brief consideration.
In the first place, laws are no\abrupt1y to be changed:
••• those things which belong
to art have their efficacy from
reason alone; and hence wherever
it happens that there is opportunity for their betterment, that
whioh was previously in force is
to be changed. But laws have
their greatest foroe from oustdm
••• and they are therefore not
lightly to be changed. 5
But progress in the law is not exo1uded:
human ••• law derives from the
will of man regulated by reason.
But as the reason and will of
man in things to be done are
manifested in words, so also
are they manifested in deed.
For eaoh person seems to choose
as a good that whioh he carries
out in doing. But it is evident
that a law can be changed and
likewise interpreted by words,
insofar as these manifest an interior ohange and conoept of the
human reason. Henoe it is also

4 M••• consuetudo et habet vim legis, et legem abolet, et
est legum 1nterpretatrix." S.T., Iallae, q.97, a.3.
5 ~.1., IaIlae, q.97, a.2, ad 1um.

f

possible by deeds, especially
the multiplication of deeds
which constitute a custom, to
change or interpret a law and
even to establish something
having the force of law; inasmuch as these exterior multiplied acts most effeotively
declare the interior ohange
of the will and the concepts
of reason. For when something
is done repeatedly, it seemingly proceeds from a .deliberate judgment of the "'reason ••• 6

.'

What interests us in this example is that that which ultimately decides what is for the common good is not the law
but the socially exercised prudential judgment of the people.
And this brings us to the central point towards which our
whole thesis has been tending.
Whoever makes the choice of the form of government -the whole multitude, a group, or a person -- will have to
act in accordance with reason. 7 For to establish a state

...

s.~., IaIIae, q.97, ~3. Of. Rousselot, 2E. £!i., p.239:
Tlous avone distingu$, dans l'individu, des jugements intimes, fonciers et vitaux, d'avec les propositions qui forment oomme la peripherie verbale de la vie intelleotuelle;
on se rappelle l'exemple de llhomme ivre: tetsi ore proferat hoo non esse faoiendum, tamen interius hoo animo sentit
quod sit faoiendum. t [la2ae, q.77 a.2 ad 5J. Il '1 a, dans
la oonscienoe des peuples, un phenomene exaotement semblable. La ooutume ~ contre la loi, paree autelle est
ltexpression d'un jugement plus refleohi et plus profond."
Of.
the remarkable text in De veritate, q.17, a.5, ad ~um:
7
"Subditus non habet judicare de praeoepto praelati, sed de
impletione praecepti, quae ad ipsum spectate Unusqu~sque
enim tenetur actus suos examinare ad soientiam quam a Deo
habet, sive sit naturalis, sive acquisita, sive infusa: omnis enim homo debet secundum rationem agere.- Of. ~.,

6
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is a work of the praotical reason, in fact its prinoipal
aohievement. g low running through the whole order of practioal knowing there is a line 9 whioh oonnects this knowing,
and brings it into continuity, with prudence -- right reason

.

about things to be done. 10 Along\~is line we may distinguish, as we have seen, 11

different levels aooording as the

oonsideration beoomes less universal;.these levels are ocoupied by the praotioal soiences.

But when it is a question of

an aotual ohoice here and now, the practical soiences alone
are an insuffioient guide. 12 As SCiences, they are universal;

g

9

10
11
12

0., "Oonsoientia ligabit praeoepto praelati in oontrarium
existente."
"Est enim oivitas principalissimum eorum quae humana ratione constitui possunt." Pol., prologue.
Of. De veritate, q.lg, a. 7, ad 7um: "Soientia operabilium
ad prudentiam pertinens ••• ; IaIIae, q.66, a.5, ad lum:
•••• unde in hoo est prudentia, seu politioa~ ministra
sapientiae ••• ·; In ~., III, d.33, q.2,5, ad lum; d.35:
q.l, a.3, q.2, ad 2um. On this "oonfused" usage in the
soholastic vocabulary, see Karitain, Les degres du savoir,
p·g9l.
~.D. de Virtutibus Oardinalibus, a.2; of. !.!., IaIIae,
q.71, a.6.
See above, Ohapter II.
MOe que nous voulons seu1ement retenir ioi, otest que
oette philosophie pratique ne suffit pas a reg1er l'aotion
El1e sait dtune mani~re enoore theorique, speculative, explicative, des choses qui son non pas seulement a exp1iquer, mais a faire. Elle assemble en ~n ~steme soiehtifique toutes 1es c~nnaissances propres areg1er de ~
l'action, ctest-a-dire toutes 1e regulations de l'action
qui se decouvrent a l'inte11ect adaptant a l'ueage pratique un outi11age, un mode de discernement du vrai encore
typiquement specu1atif. Le philosophe 1e plus averti et
1e plus oompetent dans lee matieres de llethique peut se
trouver deconcerte devant 1e plus petit acte a poser et
A
il peut mener lui-meme
une vie immora1e." J.Maritain,' Les

........

,

.'

in the case in which the choioe is to be made the things to
be considered are contingent partioulars.

And it belongs to

prudence "rightly to judge concerning the human goOd in single
things to be done." 13

To prudence it belongs to make the

applioation of right reason to the w~r to be done. l~
The possible objeotion that prudence has to do only with
the rule of one's self is forestalled:

'.

[This would b~ contradictory to
right reason, whioh judges that
the common good is better than
the good of one. Therefore, because it pertains to prudence
rightly to oounsel, judge and
command in those things by which
one arrives at the due end, it
is evident that prudence regards
not only the private good of one
man but also the common good of
the multitude. 15
This species of prudenoe is called political. 16
At the conorete level of an aotua1 situation the choice

~

of the best form of government, therefore, will be guided by

degr{s du savoir, pp. 620-621.
"Oportet quod ratio praotioa perficiatur aliquo habitu ad
hoc quod recte dijudicet de bono humano secundum singula
agenda. Et haec virtus dicitur prudentia." De virtutibus
in oommuni, a.6. "Prudentia ino1udit cognitionem et universalium et singu1arium operabilium ad quae prudens.universa1ia principia app1icat." i.l., IIallae, q.~7, a.15.
l~ "Ad prudentiam ••• pertinet ••• applicatio rectae rationis
ad opus ••. " S.T., IIallae, q.~7, a.4.
15 S.T., IIallae, q747, a.10.
10 T •.. dioitur autem politica secundum ordinem ad bonum
commune." i.l., IIallae, q.~7, a.ll.

13

f
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the prudential jUdgment.

At this level St. Thomas does not

give us any statement as to which is the best form.
we expect any such statement.

Nor can

This is clear if we bear in

.

mind the fact that the prudential judgment
is incommunica.
ble. 17. As O'Neil says:

~

It is the very incommunicability
of prudence which puts it beyond
the competence of the~ost learned
and devoted teachers. The most
inspiring lecturer cannot impart
it, and the most carefully wrought
book cannot contain it. ror prudence is a man's very precious
possession, his own and incommunioable wisdom. Koral philosophy
may be learned, moral sciences
may be taught. Prudence must be
lived. 19
And thus, at the prudential level the question of the best
form 'of government has to be left open, to be decided in

17

"Those very characteristios which elevate prudence to
the dignity of wisdom make it an incommunicable wisdom.
Human operation in .the temporal order is the human person in his ultimate fulfillment: in my act of union
with good I am most fully myself; but my aot is my own
and no other's act can be mine. And as I am myself inoommunicable so is the rational perfection of my aot
incommunioable. For only the human individual can resolve the last doubt that calls for counsel; the human
individual has only his own native ability and expe~
ience to sharpen his intuition of the practical situation; only the human individual himself oan issue the
ultimate moral precept, for that command is beard in
that inner realm, wherein, under God, he alone is master." Oharles J. O'Neil, Prudence, The Incommunicable
Wisdom, 1n Essays in Thomism (New York, Sheed and Ward,
1942), pp. 203- 204.
19 Ibid., p.204.

each instance in view of the concrete contingencies of' the
given situation.
With our descent to the prudential judgment our hypothesis as to the framework within which St. Thomas treats

.

.. 4;

the question of the best form of government is complete.

We

believe that it fulfills the requirements of a good hypothesis, namely, that "it explains in a

~onsistent

fashion all

the facts which it was assumed to account for." 19

That

hypothesis, together with oollocations of the doctrine to
the corresponding levels, is as follows:
at.Thomas treats the question of the best form of government wholly within the order of practical knowing.
At what we have identified as the top-level of this
order, his teaching is that monarohy is the best form of
government.

This is the absolute oonsideration at the

spec-~

ulatively-practioal level of the order of practical knowing.
At a lower level of the speculatively-practioal division
his decision is in favor of some form of mixed regime.

At

this lower level oonsideration of the problem is made with
conditions in view, i.e., possible diffioulties of realization are taken into account in a general way.
In the Summa Theologica, I&IIae, q.105, a.l, it is a
-------~-------

19

Carolus Friok, B.J., Logioa, ed. 5a, (Friburgi Brisgoviae,
Herder, 1919), p.9l.
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question of practioally-praotioal knowing.

st. 'l'homaa'ts

teaohing here is that the partioular oombination of simple
forms of government instituted by God for the Jewish people
was best in view of the oiroumstanoes •

...

;, ;

At the level of oonorete ohoioe the best form of government is to be determined by prudenoe in the sense of the
virtue of praotioal wisdom.

In the last analysis, therefore,

the problem of the best form of government oan only be answered by a ·prudential" judgment.

L.

D.

S.
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